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Wall Street Trading Firms as
Securities "Insiders"
Alan R. Johnston and Lawrence A. Coles, Jr.*
What the Court does today is substantially to eliminate
"the great Wall Street trading firms" from the operation
of § 16 (b) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]....
T HIs IS THE OPENING SENTENCE of Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion in the recently decided case of Blau v. Lehman.'
This is how many, including the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion, which appeared as amicus curiae, view the effect of this
decision.
While some quarters of the investment banking business are
heartened by this decision, other quarters are concerned about
the "elimination" viewpoint of Justice Douglas and the SEC and
whether it portends further action on the part of the SEC to
seek legislation to rectify what it deems a "large and unintended
loophole in the statute".2
The purpose of this article is to examine this view of the
Blau case, the implications of the SEC's decision In The Matter
of Cady, Roberts and Co.3 and the possible ramifications of this
view and of the Cady, Roberts decision on the future trading
activities of investment banking firms.4
The Blau Case
The plaintiff in the Blau case was a stockholder of Tide
Water Associated Oil Company (the stock of which was listed
on the New York Stock Exchange), who brought an action on
* Partner and associate, respectively, in the law firm of Thompson, Ray-
mond, Mayer and Jenner, of Chicago, Illinois.
1 368 U. S. 403, 82 S. Ct. 451 (1962), affirming 286 F. 2d 786 (2d Cir., 1960).
The opinion of the district court is reported at 173 F. Supp. 590 (S. D. N. Y.,
1959).
2 Supra n. 1 at 411 (1962).
3 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668 (November 8, 1961), 1961 4
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Par. 76803.
4 This article is intended to be limited to the above subject matter. It is
not intended to be another general critique of the Blau case, several of
which have been previously published. See 37 Notre Dame Law. 538
(1962), 50 Ill. B. J. 631 (1962), and 3 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. R. 561 (1962).
See also 14 Stan. L. Rev. 192 (1961), 34 Colum. L. Rev. 926 (1961), and 49
Geo. L. J. 779 (1961), commenting on the decision in the Court of Appeals.
As to the general nature of stockholders' rights and duties inter sese [in-
cluding Sec. 16(b)] see, 3 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, ch. 62 (1959).
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behalf of the company under § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to recover, with interest, "short-swing" profits5 al-
legedly realized in the trading of that company's securities by
Lehman Brothers, a partnership engaged in investment banking,
brokering of securities and the trading of securities for its own
account. Also named as a defendant was a Joseph H. Thomas, a
member of the partnership who was also a director of Tide
Water.
The complaint did not allege that Tide Water was entitled
to the "short-swing" profits of Lehman Brothers simply by virtue
of one of its partners (Thomas) being a director of Tide Water
and a purchase and sale by the partnership within a six months
period. The complaint alleged, rather, that the partnership "de-
puted" Thomas to represent its interests as a director of Tide
Water and that the purchase and sale within six months on the
basis of the use of special and inside knowledge of Thomas,
constituted a violation of § 16 (b) for which Tide Water was en-
titled to the entire profits realized by the partnership.6
The evidence was in conflict with the allegations of deputiza-
tion and use of "inside" information by Lehman Brothers. The
trial court found that there was no evidence that Lehman
Brothers deputed Thomas to represent its interests as a director
on the board of directors of Tide Water; that there had been no
actual use of inside information; and that Lehman Brothers
5 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78p (b)
(1958)) provides in part as follows:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or
officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) with-
in any period of less than six months, unless such security was ac-
quired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or
of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding. six
months ...
The six months period specified in Section 16(b) gives rise to the
phrase "short swing" in describing these profits.
6 The complaint sought to recover the entire profits on the transactions
either from the partnership or Thomas himself. The Court found Thomas
liable only for his proportionate share of the entire profits. This article
is primarily concerned with the question of whether the profits realized
by the partnership can be recovered. Reference will be made to the profits
recoverable from Thomas only for purposes of clarification where necessary,
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bought its Tide Water stock solely on the basis of public an-
nouncements by Tide Water without consulting Thomas.
These findings were not disturbed by either the Court of
Appeals7 or the Supreme Court" and both decisions were predi-
cated thereon. Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court held that the mere fact that a partner in Lehman Brothers
was a director of Tide Water at the time of the "short-swing"
transactions was not sufficient to make the partnership liable for
the profits thereof; nor was the partner-director individually
liable for all of such profits."
Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court based
their decisions on an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals in
Rattner v. Lehman.1 0
The Rattner case was decided on similar facts, i.e., a partner
of Lehman Brothers was a director of Consolidated Vultee Air-
craft Corporation and "short-swing" profits were realized by
Lehman Brothers on the purchase and sale of Consolidated
Vultee stock. The court there held the partner-director liable
only for his proportionate share of the partnership profits. It
refused to hold Lehman Brothers liable for the profits realized
by it on the grounds that § 16 (b) contained no provision requir-
ing the partners of a "director" to account for profits realized by
them."
7 286 F. 2d 786, 789 (2d Cir., 1960).
8 Supra n. 1.
9 The Court of Appeals found Thomas liable only for his share of the total
profits; that he was liable for such share irrespective of his waiver or dis-
claimer of such share. The Court stated that whether he actually received
his share was immaterial as he is deemed to have realized profits and must
account for them. 286 F. 2d 786, 790, 791 (2d Cir., 1960). This question
was not before the Supreme Court and it did not rule thereon.
The question of whether Thomas was also liable for interest on his
share of the profits was before the Supreme Court and it affirmed the Court
of Appeals' denial of such interest on the grounds that the allowance of
interest under these circumstances is a matter of judicial discretion and
that there had been no showing that the denial was either so unfair or so
inequitable as to require the court to upset it.
10 193 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir., 1952).
11 It should be noted that the court in the Rattner case found support for
its holding that the partner-director is liable for only his proportionate
share of the partnership profits in SEC Rule X-16A-3 (as it then existed)
which permitted a partner to file a report "only as to that amount of such
equity securities which represents his proportionate interest in the partner-
ship." 1961 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Par. 25811. The Rule was amended
after the Rattner decision to require that a partner-director report the
(Continued on next page)
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In view of the Rattner decision it is clear as to why the com-
plaint in the Blau case did not simply allege that the partnership
was liable because one of its partners was a director of Tide
Water at the time of the "short-swing" transactions. This would
have alleged the same facts upon which Rattner was decided.
Instead, the plaintiff in the Blau case framed his complaint in
terms of the partnership having "deputed" the partner-director
to represent its interests on the board and that the purchase and
sale was motivated by inside information. This complaint was
undoubtedly inspired by some dictum of Judge Learned Hand in
his concurring opinion in the Rattner case to the effect that while
he agreed with the majority's construction of § 16 (b), he was
not passing on the question "as to whether, if a firm deputed a
partner to represent its interests as a director on the board, the
other partners would be liable." 12
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court had
to reach this question in the Blau case as the findings of the trial
court practically equated Blau to Rattner and the reviewing
courts simply stood on the Rattner precedent, i.e., no partnership
liability can be predicated on the basis of the partner-director
relationship alone. '
Dissenting Opinions in the Blau Case
Underlying the position of the vigorous dissenting opinions
of Judge Clark in the Court of Appeals 14 and Justice Douglas
in the Supreme Court, 15 is the question as to whether deputiza-
(Continued from preceding page)
entire amount of such equity securities held by his partnership. See Secur-
ities Exchange Act Release No. 4754 (1952).
While the Rule was further amended in 1961 to delete the requirement
that a partner-director report the entire amount of such equity securities
held by his partnership (see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6487
(1961)), this requirement has now been incorporated into the instructions
for the use of Forms 3 and 4 adopted by the SEC for the reports required
to be filed under § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 1961 2 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep., Pars. 33701 and 33721.
12 193 F. 2d 564, 567 (2d Cir., 1952).
13 It is of interest, however, that in deciding the Blau case, the Supreme
Court, in dictum, suggested that Lehman Brothers would have been liable
if it "functioned as a director" through Thomas, i.e., had deputized Thomas
to perform director duties for Lehman Brothers. Thus, while the Court of
Appeals did not concur in Judge Learned Hand's observation in Rattner
that a different case might be presented where the partner has been depu-
tized, the Supreme Court, also in dictum, indicated that this would consti-
tute a different case and the partnership would be liable.
14 Judge Clark was joined in his dissent by Judge Smith.
15 Justice Douglas was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Warren.
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tion is necessary to create a different case. Both dissents take
the position that the relationship of a partner-director to his
investment banking firm is such that by its nature the partner-
director is deputized and inside information is used (or available
for use). For example, Judge Clark accused the majority judges
of the Court of Appeals of naivete in not recognizing the "facts
of financial life." He alluded to Thomas' deposition testimony to
the effect that Thomas advised his partners from time to time
that Tide Water, under the new management, was a good invest-
ment; that he was asked for his opinion of the company and,
after observing it for some time under the new management, ad-
vised that the new management was first-rate and that the com-
pany would do well under that management; that he had discus-
sions with the trading partner who directed the firm's purchases
of Tide Water stock and who testified that Thomas spoke highly
of the Tide Water prospects.
As stated by Judge Clark:
Unless judges are to be incredibly naive as to the facts of
financial life, it is difficult to see what Thomas needed to
say more to show that the lily was already gilded.16
Justice Douglas further elaborates on the concern expressed
by Judge Clark. In commenting that the decision eliminates "the
great Wall Street trading firms" from the operation of § 16 (b),
he stated:
This result follows because of the wide dispersion of partners
of investment banking firms among our major corporations.
Lehman Bros. has partners on 100 boards. Under today's
ruling that firm can make a rich harvest on the 'inside in-
formation' which § 16 of the Act covers because each partner
need account only for his distributive share of the firm's
profits on 'inside information', the other partners keeping
the balance. This is a mutilation of the Act. 17
In tracing the history and purposes of Section 16 (b), Justice
Douglas quoted from the Senate Reports on the hearings pre-
ceding the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act. For ex-
ample, Senate Report 1455, 73rd Congress, Second Session, p. 68
states:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings
before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their
16 Supra n. 7 at 795.
17 Supra n. 2 at 415.
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fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who
used their positions of trust and the confidential information
which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their
market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the
unscrupulous employment of inside information by large
stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised
sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to
enable them to acquire and profit by information not avail-
able to others. (Emphasis added.)
This report reflects the premises upon which § 16(b) is
based, i.e., because of the abuse that has been made of insider
positions such as directorships and officerships of a corporation,
a policy was adopted to discourage such activity. Such policy
holds an officer or director liable for any profits realized on the
purchase or sale, or sale and purchase, of his company's securi-
ties (if listed on a national exchange) within six months and
such transactions are conclusively presumed to have been based
on inside information and the profits are recoverable by the
company.
While the provisions of Section 16(b) may literally be con-
fined to directors and officers, Justice Douglas observes that the
purpose of § 16 (b) was being circumvented by a strained read-
ing of the law, one that "allows all but one partner to share in
the feast which the one places on the partnership table." 18 He
and Judge Clark would read § 16 (b) as including the partnership
under the circumstances of this case.
Is the Purpose of Section 16(b) Defeated by Excluding
Partnership Profits From Its Coverage?
In view of the findings of the trial court, the dissenting
opinions in the Blau case must be viewed as predicated on the
thesis that the liability therein contemplated stems from the
relationship of a partner-director to his partnership itself and
not from the deputization of a partner nor from the use of
specific inside information in a particular transaction. Critical
then is whether the exclusion of partnership profits from the
coverage of § 16 (b) under the facts of the Blau case defeats the
statutory purposes of § 16 (b).
Unfortunately for the investment banking business, the past
looms as a haunting specter over this issue. The reports on the
adoption of the Securities Exchange Act are replete with con-
18 Supra n. 2 at 420.
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demnation of the abuses of insider information and the part
played therein by large investment banking firms. Against this
background must be viewed the purposes of the Act to put an
end to such practices. For example, the policy behind § 16 (b)
was stated in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.:
We must suppose that the statute was intended to be thor-
oughgoing, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock trans-
actions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to
prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary
officer, director or stockholder and the faithful performance
of his duty.19
Justice Douglas attached as an appendix to this dissenting
opinion, extracts of the opinion in Lehman v. Civil Aeronautics
Board,20 which deals extensively with the problem of interlock-
ing directorates through the agency of an investment banking
firm.
The court there pointed out, in the context of interlocking
directorates, that an investment banking firm places its partners
on boards of directors for the benefit of the investment banking
firm; that the mere relationship gives rise to benefits to the firm.
The court stated:
The underwriting activities of Lehman Brothers is a sub-
stantial part of its business: substantial fees are also ob-
tained by Lehman Brothers from merger negotiations. Prof-
its from the fees are shared by the partners. Section 409 (a)
companies, with Lehman Brothers partners as directors,
need and use both types of services, and the partner direc-
tors seek such business for the partnership. In doing so they
act as representatives of the partnership. It follows that
they act as representatives of fellow partners, some of whom
are directors of air carriers. Is this representation within
the meaning of the statute? Does Mr. Thomas, to use his
case as illustrative, who is a Lehman Brothers partner and
also a director of National Airlines, represent, as director
of National Airlines, Mr. Lehman, another Lehman Brothers
partner and director of Pan American? We think that the
affirmative answer of the Board should not be disturbed.
. . . In these activities there is not only literal representa-
tion by one partner of another in partnership business but
the particular partnership business is as well the business
of aeronautical enterprises of which the partners are direc-
tors.
19 136 F. 2d 231, 239 (2d Cir., 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 751 (1943).
20 209 F. 2d 289, 292-294 (D. C. Cir. 1953), cert denied, 347 U. S. 916 (1954).
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The court continued:
When Mr. Thomas, again to illustrate, as director of Nation-
al seeks to guide that company's underwriting business to
Lehman Brothers he acts in the interest of and for the bene-
fit of Mr. Lehman who is not only his underwriting partner
but is also a director of an air carrier, Pan American. Mr.
Lehman the partner is the same Mr. Lehman the director.
The Board is not required to separate him into two person-
alities, as it were, and to say that Mr. Thomas represents
him as a partner but not as a director, if, as in the case here,
the representation is in regard to the carrying on of the
affairs of Section 409 (a) companies. The undoubted repre-
sentation which grows out of the partnership we think fol-
lows into the directorships when the transactions engaged
in are not only by the partners but concern companies regu-
lated by the statute, of which the partners are directors.
This is representation within not only the language but the
meaning of the statute.
21
Position of the SEC
It is essentially this view of the relationship between invest-
ment banking partners and the partnership that gives rise to the
SEC's position that it is immaterial whether a partnership actu-
ally deputizes one of its partners; that under the above circum-
stances, a partner is deemed to serve the interests of the part-
nership as a matter of law. Judge Clark, in his dissenting opin-
ion in the Blau case stated:
In fact I regard all this discussion whether or not the firm
'deputed' its members to sit on many corporate boards as
naive. Obviously this was an arrangement of mutual bene-
fit to both sides; what difference can it make in realities
which extended the first invitation? And what further
official 'deputation' is needed more than the mere fact of this
mutually beneficial arrangement. 22
The SEC's position is stated in their brief in the Blau case
as follows (page 12):
The prevalence of partners of investment banking firms on
the boards of directors of the country's large corporations
is not mere coincidence. Rather, it is the result of the delib-
21 136 F. 2d 289, 293 (D. C. Cir., 1953). Of course, no distinction is there
made as to the type of benefits realized by investment banking firms, i.e.,
whether there is a distinction between underwriting benefits, on the one
hand, and trading benefits on the other. Investment bankers concede the
underwriting benefits but take issue with the trading benefits.
22 Supra n. 7 at 795.
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erate effort of investment banking firms to establish close
relationships with the issuers of securities. As was noted in
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 652 (S. D. N. Y.),
'the competition for business by investment bankers must
start with an effort to establish or continue a relationship
with the issuer,' and the facts indicate that Lehman Broth-
ers placed a partner on the board of Tide Water for this
purpose (see pp. 3-4, supra). Membership on boards of di-
rectors is intimately related to the business of investment
banking, for it is a most effective means of establishing a
close relationship. Thus to disregard the relationship of the
Lehman directorships to the business of the firm is to dis-
count a significant portion of the firm's goodwill ...
The SEC's brief concludes (page 13):
While the primary purpose of an investment banking firm
in placing its partners on the board of corporations may be
to obtain underwriting business, it cannot be assumed in
the light of the text and legislative history of Section 16(b)
that a firm, which is also engaged in the business of trading
in securities, will ignore in its trading activities the inside
information obtained from partner-directors. (Emphasis
added.)
While the resolution of the question whether trading profits
are realized from such a relationship in and of itself is difficult
of proof, it would appear that there is sufficient concern that
trading profits are realized from this type of relationship that the
SEC will either continue its attempts to impose § 16 (b) liability
on partnership profits under the facts of the Blau case or seek
alternative sanctions.
The Cady, Roberts Case As A Possible Alternative Sanction
Representative of the SEC's continuing efforts to equate a
partner-director (or other representative) of an investment
banking firm with the other partners and the firm itself is In the
Matter of Cady, Roberts and Co.,23 which Chairman Cary of the
SEC himself has characterized as "a case of first impression and
one of signal importance in our administration of the federal
securities acts." 24
The proceedings in Cady, Roberts were instituted by the
SEC to determine whether Cady, Roberts and Co., and Robert
M. Gintel, a partner, willfully violated the "anti-fraud" provi-
sions of § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 pro-
23 1961 4 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., 1 76803.
24 Id at 81014.
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mulgated under that Act and § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of
1933, by executing solicited orders and selling for discretionary
accounts (upon an exchange) without disclosure to the buyers
of non-public information as to the company's dividend action
communicated to Gintel by a representative of Cady, Roberts
and Co. who served on the company's board of directors.
The Commission found both Gintel and the registrant guilty
of the charges, and sanctions were imposed pursuant to an offer
of settlement which was accepted by the Commission as being
in the public interest.
Pertinent to the Blau facts is the statement by the SEC of
the special insider duties that arise out of special relationships
to a corporation. The SEC decision states:
The anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of 'any per-
son' and that a special obligation has been traditionally re-
quired of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors and con-
trolling stockholders. These three groups, however, do not
exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an
obligation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two princi-
pal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
In considering these elements under the broad language of
the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by
fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here
is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship
with the company and privy to its internal affairs, and there-
by suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Inti-
macy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited. 25
(Emphasis added.)
As to the responsibilities of disclosure of the partner receiv-
ing inside information, it was stated:
The facts here impose on Gintel [selling partner] the re-
sponsibilities of those commonly referred to as 'insiders.' He
received the information prior to its public release from a
director of Curtiss-Wright, Cowdin, who was associated with
the registrant [Cady, Roberts and Co.]. Cowdin's relation-
ship to the company clearly prohibited him from selling the
the securities affected by the information without disclos-
ure. By logical sequence, it should prohibit Gintel, a part-
25 Id. at 81017.
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ner of the registrant. This prohibition extends not only over
his own account, but to selling for discretionary accounts
and soliciting and executing other orders.
20
Thus, the SEC proceeded against Cady, Roberts and Co.
with principles allied to its argument in the Blau case. In Blau,
the SEC argued that an investment banking partnership which
has a partner on a corporation's board of directors occupies a
special relationship to that corporation which enables it to profit
in its trading of that corporation's securities. in the Cady, Rob-
erts case, the SEC underscores the special nature of that relation-
ship by holding that if as a result of such relationship the part-
ner-director (or other representative) communicates "inside"
information to his partner in the investment banking firm, such
partner, and the investment banking firm itself, will be commit-
ting fraud if they fail to make proper disclosure of such infor-
mation in their trading activities. 27
Thus, while investment banking firms may be insulated from
liability under the facts of the Blau case, it is clear from the
Cady, Roberts decision that the SEC is putting investment bank-
ing firms on notice that they will be liable for failure to disclose
inside information obtained from representatives or partners
who serve as directors of corporations whose securities they are
trading.
Query, whether the disclosure obligations of the Cady,
Roberts decision obviate the necessity for extending the sanc-
tions of § 16 (b) to partnership profits under the circumstances
of Blau. It might be argued that if the partnership is required
to disclose all inside information in its trading activities, the ob-
jectives of § 16 (b) have been accomplished and there is no need
to impose its sanctions on such profits.
The Prospects of Future Legislation
Investment banking firms have long enjoyed the underwrit-
ing and other business benefits of having partners or represen-
tatives serve as directors of corporations. The SEC claims that
the Rattner case opened their eyes to the trading benefits that
26 Ibid.
2T While the penalty imposed in the Cady, Roberts case was relatively mild,
the penalty could be much more severe. Obviously, the Commission was
less concerned with the penalty than it was with establishing the princi-
ples therein involved.
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may also be enjoyed. While investment banking firms do not
dispute the first benefits, they do dispute that there are trading
benefits or that they take advantage of inside information to real-
ize trading benefits. The SEC, however, has contended that trad-
ing benefits do result or that at least the possibility of such bene-
fits should subject the investment banking firms to the provi-
sions of § 16 (b) under the Blau facts.
Whether the SEC deems the disclosure obligations of Cady,
Roberts a satisfactory alternative to the § 16 (b) sanctions sought
in the Blau case, is conjectural. If it does, it may not seek to
amend § 16(b) to extend that section to include partnership
profits under the circumstances of Blau. On the other hand, if,
notwithstanding the disclosure obligations of Cady, Roberts, it
believes the possibility of abuse of insider positions is still likely
in the special relationship of a partner-director to his partner-
ship, it may recommend that Congress amend § 16 (b) to provide
the sanctions sought in the Blau case. How successful the invest-
ment banking community will be in opposing such legislation if
proposed will depend, in part, on whether investment bankers
can demonstrate that the trading profits, if any, realized from
having a partner-director on a corporation's board of directors
are de minimis non curat lex, and that, in any event, the disclos-
ure obligations of Cady, Roberts, if upheld by the courts, impose
an effective alternative sanction against the use of inside infor-
mation under these circumstances.
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